By GABRIEL PARTOS
Twenty-five years have passed since the heady days of December 1990 when students’ protests about their living conditions turned into a chaotic but otherwise largely peaceful political revolution. In a matter of a few months, the revolution transformed Albania from a totalitarian, communist-ruled state into an emerging democracy, as multi-party elections in 1991 and 1992 began to reflect the political will of the majority of the population. Soon there were to be setbacks on the way of democratisation—perhaps best illustrated by the political crisis of 1996-97 when concern over a slide back towards a more authoritarian form of government added political direction to the public anger over the collapse of fraudulent pyramid investment schemes. The anti-government uprising in early 1997 could have led to a civil war but this was averted through a compromise agreement, mediated by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which led to the holding of an early election in June/July 1997, and subsequently the process of building democracy resumed.
However, as various reports and surveys show, democracy in Albania continues to have a wide range of shortcomings. There are many ways of assessing the successes and failures of democratisation. Among official evaluations prepared by international or multi-lateral bodies, the annual reports of the European Commission provide a regular assessment of the development of democratic institutions and practices in Albania in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, laid down in 1993, for countries that seek to join the European Union (EU). The most recent of these reports, published in November 2015, gives a cautious assessment, noting “steady progress” being made in several areas relating to the consolidation of democratic governance[1]. The OSCE, through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), provides detailed reports on the conduct of elections. There are also several non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Foundation, that compile valuable, regular assessments of the fate of democracy around the world, including in Albania.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)—the company that the author of this paper works for—publishes an annual Democracy Index that ranks 167 countries in order of their respect for and practical application of the principles of democracy. In this paper I intend to follow the classification employed by the Democracy Index, which is based on five categories: the electoral process and political pluralism; the functioning of government; political participation; political culture; and civil liberties. This classification has the advantage of providing a comprehensive assessment of the evolving state of democracy, which goes beyond the scope of other forms of evaluation that are frequently limited to assessments of a narrower range of criteria, primarily elections and human rights.
However, before addressing this issue, it is worth recalling that there is another method of gauging the success or otherwise of the consolidation of democracy in Albania: viewing it through the eyes of Albanian citizens. Albanians’ deep-seated wariness and even suspicion of their democratic institutions is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the most trusted institution, according to a recent survey—conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation—is neither Albanian nor democratic: it is NATO, which is trusted by 71% of respondents. In fact, no Albanian political body features in the five most trusted institutions identified in the survey, in which NATO is followed in descending order of the level of trust by the EU; the Albanian armed forces; religious institutions; and the media. The most positively-viewed political institution is the government, in which 37% of those asked in the survey expressed trust. The level of trust in parliament (29%) and the president (25%) are even lower, but the most negative assessments are reserved for political parties and the judiciary, which fewer than one-fifth of respondents felt they could trust[2].
Turning to the EIU’s latest Democracy Index[3], the five categories that it employs for assessing the state of democracy in each country provide a number of clues as to why some areas have proved more problematic than others and what factors have been holding back progress in Albania. I will also reflect briefly on how Albania compares with its western Balkan peers. In the Democracy Index Albania is in 81st place, about half-way down the global rankings, behind Serbia (58th), Macedonia (78th) and Montenegro (79th), but well ahead of Bosnia and Herzegovina (104th). Given the progress made by Albania in the 12 months since the 2014 survey (when it was in 88th place) and the serious backsliding observed in Macedonia (dropping from 72nd place in 2014), the latest Democracy Index indicates that Albania has almost completely closed the previously wide gap on its neighbour.
Albania scores relatively well (7 out of a maximum of 10) in the electoral process and pluralism category, which may appear somewhat surprising, given that elections remain highly controversial and their results are, almost inevitably, challenged by the losing side. One reason for the doubts that continue to overshadow elections is that Albania’s initial experience of multi-party ballots in the 1990s was negative: the circumstances surrounding voting in 1991, 1996 and 1997 were particularly controversial.
Since 2001 there has been considerable—if at times uneven—progress, as documented by successive reports issued by ODIHR. The blatant ballot-rigging, intimidation and media domination by the ruling side, which characterised the elections of the 1990s, have been largely consigned to the past. Initially, these serious shortcomings gave way to more technical problems, involving voter registration, the updating of electoral rolls and the reliability of voters’ identity documents. These technical difficulties were frequently exploited by the ruling parties, both at the national and local levels, for electoral gain. In recent years there has been a marked improvement in the technical administration of the electoral process, starting with the elections of 2009, when the voter lists were based, for the first time, on the computerised records of the National Civil Status Register. The issuing of new, more secure identity cards and biometric passports has also contributed to diminishing the opportunities for multiple voting[4].
As a result of progress in the technical administration of elections, concern has focused on political squabbles, relating, for example, to the composition of the Central Election Commission at the time of the June 2013 parliamentary elections. Disputes of this kind have continued to poison the political atmosphere, weakening the public’s trust in the integrity of the elections. ODIHR’s overall assessment of the 2013 elections was finely balanced between the positive and negative aspects. The report noted that the elections had “been competitive with active citizen participation throughout the campaign and genuine respect for fundamental freedoms. However, the… distrust between the two main political forces tainted the electoral environment and challenged the administration of the entire electoral process” [5].
In addition to the continuing politicisation of the electoral process, there are also concerns about the professionalism of the electoral authorities. It is worth noting that, despite the considerable progress achieved in the conduct of elections since the late 1990s, on those occasions when the outcome of a vote is very close and there is much at stake, as was the case in the Tirana mayoral elections in 2011, some forms of electoral manipulation tend to return, and this was noted at the time by the EU officials[6]. However, overall the development has been in a positive direction. The 2013 parliamentary elections attracted fewer substantive complaints than previous polls, and the improvement was maintained in the local authority elections in June 2015.
Given that the election results reflect, broadly speaking, the will of electorate, the remaining shortcomings relating to the electoral process are not likely to be a significant cause of Albanians’ dissatisfaction with their country’s democratic institutions. In any case, nationwide elections are held only once every two years (with local authority elections held half-way through the four-year mandate of parliament), while there are other aspects of public life that have an ongoing, often daily, impact on citizens’ lives. Most important among these is the functioning of government in its broadest sense, involving the executive, the state administration, the legislature and the judiciary. This category receives the lowest score in the Democracy Index (4.36 out of 10), and the poor score is not surprising, given the persistence of inefficiency, incompetence and widespread corruption in the public administration, all of which cause a great deal of frustration to citizens.
It could be argued that the smooth functioning of government is not necessarily an essential component of democracy. To put it another way, there are examples in history of relatively well-functioning administrations in authoritarian states. However, some of the most important attributes of democracy, such as freedom of expression, both in the conventional media and the new social media networks—which are restricted in authoritarian states—provide public channels for criticising shortcomings in the functioning of government. For that reason, democracies are institutionally in a better position to improve the way that their state administrations work, because they can accommodate criticism and a clash of ideas. Conversely, a low level of institutional capacity in government or the judiciary undermines the public’s trust in democracy. This is a phenomenon that can be observed in Albania and other countries in the region that have similar problems.
The generally poor standard of public administration was one of the reasons why it took more than five years for Albania to receive EU candidate status, following its application for EU membership in April 2009. The EU’s decision to grant Albania candidate status in June 2014 was, in part, recognition of the initial steps taken by the current government to streamline and modernise the administration[7]. Professional training schemes have helped to improve the level of competence in the state administration and there are many highly-skilled officials in the civil service. However, the tendency to replace large numbers of senior officials each time that a party previously in opposition wins an election and forms a new government disrupts the efficient functioning of the administration. Progress has also been made in broadening the accountability of government to the public. The increasing use of social media platforms has contributed to greater transparency and has helped to open up the work of government to public scrutiny. Yet, as often as not, Facebook and Twitter have been deployed by politicians for public relations purposes or downright propaganda.
Undoubtedly the greatest obstacle to democratic governance is corruption. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2015 puts Albania in 88th place (out of 168 countries), below the other western Balkan countries, apart from Kosovo (which is in 103rd place)[8]. Albania has risen in the ranking from 110th place in the 2014 CPI, although some of the improvement is the result of the removal from the latest list of seven countries, all of which previously had a better score than Albania[9] . Politicians have been aware of the public’s intense frustration with the level of corruption over the past quarter of a century, and have frequently promised to take action. In 2005, for example, the Democratic Party (DP) returned to power, with its leader, Sali Berisha, pledging to make combating corruption his Number One priority. Similar promises have been made by politicians representing all parties that have been at one time or another in power and, therefore, in a position to take action. Yet, despite such pledges, progress has been limited, and very few high-profile cases have resulted in trials, let alone in the convictions of those accused of involvement in corrupt practices.
Part of the reason for the lack of progress in recent years in securing the convictions of prominent figures on charges of bribery is perhaps explained by the fact that the initial corruption trials in the mid-1990s—most notably that of Fatos Nano, the former Socialist Party (SP) prime minister—were perceived as being politically motivated. Since then political influence over the judiciary has greatly diminished, but it has by no means disappeared completely. More broadly, some recent initiatives indicate that the authorities are preparing to tackle corruption with a greater sense of resolve. In this context, the European Commission’s latest annual report notes the importance of the adoption of the national anti-corruption strategy (2015-20) and the associated action plan (2015-17)[10]. Pressure from the EU is likely to prove the strongest incentive for dealing with corruption, as progress in this area is one of the conditions that Albania has to meet before it can open EU accession talks.
Political participation also receives a low score (5.56 out of 10), reflecting the disenchantment of large sections of society with many of the negative developments mentioned above, such as the slow progress in consolidating democracy, the poor standards of governance, widespread corruption and the self-serving behaviour of parts of the political elite. In addition to these factors, the sharp slowdown in economic growth since the global downturn of 2008-09 has weakened the public’s confidence in the ability of successive governments to deliver a greater degree of prosperity. The low level of trust in political institutions, indicated in the survey by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation cited above[11], militates against a desire to participate in politics. Many ordinary citizens believe—not without considerable justification—that they have very little scope for influencing politics, particularly so when compared with the informal or indirect power exercised by wealthy business executives and media magnates, with close links to leading politicians. In a survey carried out across south-eastern Europe for the Regional Cooperation Council, the only 3% Albanian respondents said that they had ever been involved in a consultation process conducted by government while preparing legislation, either in the form of participating in a public debate or contributing comments via the internet. The participation rate, as reported by Albanian respondents, was the lowest in the region after Serbia (where it was 2%)[12].
Despite the disillusionment illustrated by many surveys, one of the main indicators for an interest in political participation, voter turnout at elections, has been showing some improvement in the past decade. From a low point of 48.73% in the 2005 parliamentary elections, turnout as a proportion of the electorate climbed to 50.77% in 2009 and 53.31% in 2013. These figures are, of course, dwarfed by the 90%+ turnouts registered in the first multi-party elections of 1991 and 1992, but that is to be expected, given that those initial elections gave the first taste of democracy to a public starved of choice under the one-party system of communist rule. The improvement over the past decade is also reflected when turnout is gauged by a different methodology—as a proportion of the voting age population. Given that many of those registered to vote are migrants living outside Albania with no easy access to voting, the turnout figures are more impressive, rising from 58.96% of the voting age population in 2005, to 69.11% in 2009 and 76.68% in 2013[13].
In the light of the continuing disillusionment with democratic institutions, it is not clear why participation in elections has been on the increase in the past 10 years. The larger turnout at elections may have been driven by a number of factors, such as the modest improvement in the conduct of elections—which encourages more people to vote—the political parties’ more sophisticated approach to mobilising their supporters, and better transport links, particularly for migrant workers. There has also been a marked increase, albeit from a very low base, in the representation of women in parliament, which has tripled as a proportion of all deputies, from 7.1% in 2005 (when there were 10 women in parliament) to 20.7% following the 2013 elections (29 women MPs)[14]. However, this is still a relatively low figure, and is well behind the level of women’s representation the legislatures of Serbia and Macedonia.
Political participation in terms of membership of parties and pressure groups and attendance at political events remains relatively limited, although as in many other countries, social media have opened up a relatively effortless way to engage in political life. There have also been a number of cases in recent years that demonstrate an increased interest in political participation, prompted by the success of protests or public criticism in stopping the government from taking unpopular measures. Plans to store and dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal on Albanian soil were halted in the face of protests by environmentalists[15]. More recently, in August 2015, moves to extend the tax base to those on lower incomes were abandoned following strong opposition from the public[16]. In November 2015 proposals to re-criminalise defamation were abandoned in the face of criticism from the media and international bodies, including the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Miljatović[17].
The government has not only started to pay more attention to the public—or at least, to influential sections of the public—it has also taken pro-active measures to encourage participation in politics. The parliamentary vote in November 2015 to establish a National Council for Civil Society (NCCS) marks a significant milestone in this process by providing an institutional framework for more effective consultations between the government and pressure groups[18]. As with many other initiatives which are intended to introduce greater transparency into decision-making, controversy will surround the new council, because it was set up without a parliamentary consensus and amid concerns that the authorities may be able to dominate the new body[19]. Nevertheless, it provides a potentially valuable starting point for refashioning relations on a more equal basis between two essential elements of a democratic society—elected officials and representatives of a broad range of pressure groups.
The NCCS also has the potential to contribute to improving the level of political culture, which currently scores only 5 out of 10. Although the score is low, it is still sufficient to put Albania in equal first place with Serbia in this category, and ahead of the other EU candidate countries in the region. The low score for democratic political culture reflects attitudes and behaviour patterns both among the public and the political elite. The survey result quoted earlier about the level of trust in institutions indicated that after NATO and the EU, the most trusted institution in Albania was the army[20]—by definition a non-democratic organisation, even if in democratic societies it is under the control of elected governments. Anecdotal evidence tends to show a preference among the public for strong political leaders, even if at times they overstep the democratic boundaries.
Among the political class, the use of an abrasive style and harsh rhetoric—with the language used portraying opponents as the enemy, rather than an adversary—illustrates one of the problems in consolidating a higher level of political culture. Similarly, the regularly recurring practice of walkouts from parliament undermines what is meant to be the fortress of democracy and devalues the importance of what is meant to be the supreme democratic institution in the eyes of the public. In countries which have higher scores for political culture, parliamentary boycotts are used only in the last resort, because they leave significant sections of the electorate without representation. Yet, in Albania virtually every electoral mandate has included lengthy boycotts by the minority side—most recently, for five months in the second half of 2014, by the DP and previously for even longer by the SP after the 2009 election.
The level of political culture is expected to improve considerably, following the adoption of constitutional amendments in December 2015 to bar convicted criminals from public office, including parliament, the government, the state administration and local authorities[21]. The constitutional amendments, once implemented, will help to reduce the influence of criminal elements on political life and are also likely to increase citizens’ trust in democratic institutions. Greater trust in institutions of the state could also prompt more people to participate actively in political life, going beyond simply casting their ballots in parliamentary and local elections.
Albania’s strongest score, with 7.65 out of 10, is in the civil liberties (human rights) category. Albania is in equal first place with Macedonia in the regional ranking. I do not intend to discuss Albania’s performance in the area of civil liberties in any detail, partly because this is a relative success story—and there are, therefore, fewer criticisms—and partly because an important element of this category, the freedom of the media, is analysed with great expertise by Remzi Lani in one of the other papers published in this volume. The relatively high score reflects the fact that the traditional areas associated with civil liberties—freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom to own property as well as cultural, religious and minority rights are, in the main, respected. However, the legal and institutional safeguards to protect these rights are not always applied promptly or efficiently.
There is considerable room for improvement in those aspects of human rights where the state needs to intervene more pro-actively—and sometimes at greater financial cost—to diminish outdated forms of social behaviour. These include discrimination and violence against women, child abuse and the exploitation of child labour, and the integration into society of people with physical or mental disabilities. As the annual reports of the European Commission point out, social exclusion of the Roma community remains a significant problem, despite the increased attention paid to improving their living conditions and providing better educational provisions for them[22].
By assessing the state of democracy in Albania against a set of criteria established by the Democracy Index, this analysis has, perhaps inevitably, focused on some of the weaknesses and shortcomings of democratic developments in the country. Yet taking a historical approach and comparing the pluralist politics of the present with the one-party dictatorship of the communist era, the attention would turn towards the huge progress that has been made within a generation. Some of the achievements took a relatively short time: the protection of human rights, including the freedom of expression and assembly, were secured to a considerable extent within a few years. Other aspects of democracy will take much longer to become fully embedded in Albanian public life. These include the evolution of a tolerant and inclusive political culture and the establishment of a well-functioning and respected system of institutions, including the judiciary and the civil service. However, many other countries with long-standing democratic traditions also continue to struggle to construct institutions that deserve public trust. It would be perhaps naive to expect that Albania can find the right solutions more quickly than others.
[1] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015. Online: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf p.15
[2] Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) 2015. Online: http://pasos.org/13867/pasos-project-polling-military-institutions-most-trusted-groups-in-balkans/
[3] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety, 2016. Online: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015
[4] Gabriel Partos, “Why are Albanian Elections so Controversial?” In Sà¼dosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol.51, No.1 (2011), p.91.
[5] OSCE/ODIHR Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections, 23 June 2013 Election Observation Mission Final Report. Online: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true p.1
[6] Balkan Insight website, 20 July 2011. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-disputed-poll-receives-failing-grade-from-the-eu
[7] European Commission, Report on Albania’s Progress in the Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime and in the Judicial Reform, 2014. Online: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/al_report_june_2014.pdf
[8] Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Online: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
[9] Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2014. Online: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
[10] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, op.cit. p.4
[11] PASOS survey, op. cit.
[12] Balkan Barometer 2015, Regional Cooperation Council Secretariat. Online: http://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer2015_PublicOpinion_FIN_forWeb.pdf
[13] Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Voter turnout data for Albania. Online: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=7
[14] Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Women in national parliaments, December 2015. Online: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif011215.htm
[15] The Guardian, 15 November 2013. Online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/albania-rejects-request-disposal-syrian-chemical-weapons
[16] Balkan Insight website, 10 August 2015. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/leaked-plan-to-raise-income-tax-cause-outrage-in-albania-08-10-2015
[17] OSCE website, 12 November 2015. Online: http://www.osce.org/fom/199446 and Albeu website, 12 November 2015. Online: http://english.albeu.com/news/news/government-withdraws-law-on-defamation/220034/
[18] Dritan Sulà§ebe, Preparing for Accession Negotiations: what role for civil society organizations in Albania? Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) Policy Brief, 2015. Online: http://www.aiis-albania.org/sites/default/files/Policy%20Brief_AIIS.pdf
[19] Balkan Insight website, 9 November 2015. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-forms-national-council-for-civil-society-11-06-2015
[20] PASOS survey, op. cit.
[21] Balkan Insight website. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-adopts-decriminalization-of-politics-law-12-18-2015
[22] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015. Op. cit, passim
[1] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015. Online: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf p.15
[2] Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) 2015. Online: http://pasos.org/13867/pasos-project-polling-military-institutions-most-trusted-groups-in-balkans/
[3] The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety, 2016. Online: https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015
[4] Gabriel Partos, “Why are Albanian Elections so Controversial?” In Sà¼dosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol.51, No.1 (2011), p.91.
[5] OSCE/ODIHR Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections, 23 June 2013 Election Observation Mission Final Report. Online: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/106963?download=true p.1
[6] Balkan Insight website, 20 July 2011. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-disputed-poll-receives-failing-grade-from-the-eu
[7] European Commission, Report on Albania’s Progress in the Fight Against Corruption and Organised Crime and in the Judicial Reform, 2014. Online: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/al_report_june_2014.pdf
[8] Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Online: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
[9] Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2014. Online: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results
[10] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015, op.cit. p.4
[11] PASOS survey, op. cit.
[12] Balkan Barometer 2015, Regional Cooperation Council Secretariat. Online: http://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer2015_PublicOpinion_FIN_forWeb.pdf
[13] Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Voter turnout data for Albania. Online: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=7
[14] Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Women in national parliaments, December 2015. Online: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif011215.htm
[15] The Guardian, 15 November 2013. Online: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/albania-rejects-request-disposal-syrian-chemical-weapons
[16] Balkan Insight website, 10 August 2015. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/leaked-plan-to-raise-income-tax-cause-outrage-in-albania-08-10-2015
[17] OSCE website, 12 November 2015. Online: http://www.osce.org/fom/199446 and Albeu website, 12 November 2015. Online: http://english.albeu.com/news/news/government-withdraws-law-on-defamation/220034/
[18] Dritan Sulà§ebe, Preparing for Accession Negotiations: what role for civil society organizations in Albania? Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS) Policy Brief, 2015. Online: http://www.aiis-albania.org/sites/default/files/Policy%20Brief_AIIS.pdf
[19] Balkan Insight website, 9 November 2015. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-forms-national-council-for-civil-society-11-06-2015
[20] PASOS survey, op. cit.
[21] Balkan Insight website. Online: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albania-adopts-decriminalization-of-politics-law-12-18-2015
[22] European Commission, EU Enlargement Strategy 2015. Op. cit, passim
