There is much to celebrate about United States-Albanian relations which have generally been strong, particularly in the period since 1991, but historically these relations have of course experienced many important changes and are likely to do so again with the inauguration of President Barach Obama. It is the purpose of this short paper to explore the connection between the two states and then briefly examine three principal periods of bilateral relations; 1) the period from Albanian independence through the Hoxha years 2) the post communist period since1991 3) concluding with some thoughts on the future of Albanian American relations during the Obama presidency.
The relationship between the United States and Albania has been quite solid for a number of reasons, not the least of which is American stability concerns in the Balkans and Europe as a whole. Most American administrations, at least in recent years, have appreciated the strategic position which Albania occupies on the peninsula as well as the general significance of what has been described as the “Albanian question” for the stability of the Balkans and the region. America’s stated policy goals of the promotion of democracy, some form of a market economy, and regional cooperation and integration, all of which are intended to promote regional stability, has dictated a certain focus on Albania.
Albania and Albanians have, in general, welcomed and striven to facilitate that focus, partly as a result of the clear physical and emotional attachment that many Albanians have to the United States (by 1945, for example, twenty-five percent of Albanians had either been to the US or had friends and relatives who had been there) and in part in recognition of the perceived power and resources that the United States is in a position to employ. Certainly one of the key actors here has been the Albanian-American community in the United States. While the community was relatively small at the beginning of the 20th century, counting somewhere between thirty and forty thousand by 19181, it was led by a group of dynamic individuals who founded organizations which became more influential than the size of the community would dictate. The Albanian-American community grew substantially after the Second World War into one of the largest and possibly the best educated in the Albanian diaspora. It became highly concentrated in specific areas of the United States and generally prosperous2 which allowed it to wield considerable influence on issues relating to Albanian security and development, particularly in the post-communist period.
The Albanian-American community played a particularly important role during the first period delineated here, the independence-Zog period to 1939. The first two decades of the 20th century saw the creation of three of the more important US-based institutions of the Albanian Renaissance, the Albanian Orthodox Church in America (1908); Dielli (1909), the oldest continuously published Albanian-language newspaper in the world; and the Pan-Albanian Federation “Vatra” (1912). The driving forces behind these organizations were the well-known Albania-Americans Fan Noli and Faik Konitza, both graduates of Harvard University. Among other achievements, they wrote and spoke prolifically, raised funds, and were able to attract the assistance of influential Americans, all in support of Albanian causes.3 The most important cause during this period, of course, was the recognition of Albanian independence and the maintenance of its territorial integrity. While more than half of all Albanians remained outside of the Albanian state confirmed in the post First World War period, it is certainly possible that without the persistent lobbying efforts of the Albanian-American community and its leaders, Albania would not have regained its independence or at the very least, would have emerged as an even smaller state. The refusal of American President Woodrow Wilson to support all of the provisions of an Anglo-French proposal that would have ceded more Albanian territory to Serbia and Greece, and granted Italy control over Vlore and the surrounding area as well as a mandate over the truncated Albanian state, removed the issue from the conference.4 The Albanian state was ultimately restored in November 1921 and recognized by the United States in July 1922. As a reward for their many contributions to this outcome, the Albanian-American community was allotted one seat in the new Albanian parliament and elected Fan Noli as their representative. Noli eventually rose to become prime minister in 1924 but ultimately proved to be more successful as an advocate and churchman than as a politician, and quickly lost the support of the United States and much of the Albanian-American community by failing to carry out promised reform, failing to hold elections to legitimize his regime, and by moving to extend recognition to the Soviet Union.
The return of Ahmet Zogu to power in late 1924 marked an end of a period of acute interest and participation in Albanian affairs on the part of the Albanian-American community and the United States in general. The community reduced its activity for a number of reasons, including internal rifts eventually exacerbated by the onset of the depression. The American government became less actively involved in part because of an increasing isolationist foreign policy, but also as a result of a number of other factors. The Albanian-American community became less effective as an advocate, and the first economic reports produced by American representatives in Albania were not encouraging. That the US was not overly interested is indicated by the level of diplomatic personal assigned to Albania – some of whom were uninspired political appointees. In contrast, the British, with their vast imperial/colonial experience, had many diplomats, like Sir Robert Ryan their last minister during the Zog period, who were well prepared, well informed and as a result much more active. It is interesting to read American and British dispatches from the period, where the American messages are occasionally trivial and when reporting on issues of some significance seem to mirror British dispatches sent a few days earlier.
But the US government did recognize the regime, as well as the creation of the monarchy in 1929, and concluded the usual treaties between states including a Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation in 1928, a Naturalization Treaty in 1932, an Extradition Treaty in 1933, and a Nationality Convention in 1937. The presence of US nongovernmental organization and religious organizations provided various forms of aid including schools which further solidified the connection. With Zog’s marriage to Geraldine in 1938, the connection between the court and the American mission became even stronger. Geraldine was born to an American mother whose influence seems to have been substantial and in consequence, aspects of American culture, at least in Tirana, became more pronounced in the period after 1938. The royal sisters also staged a rather flamboyant and somewhat extravagant exploratory visit to the US in that year which may have been responsible in part for Zog, in exile, purchasing an estate on Long Island New York with the prospect of settling there. That Geraldine influenced Zog in a pro-American direction is perhaps evidenced by the fact that it was to the American minister Hugh Grant that Zog turned when if came time to break his silence with regard to Italian demands during the crisis period just prior to the Italian invasion in 1939. Zog was also willing to put his family’s personal security in the hands of the Americans when during the invasion he sought the protection of the American mission for Geraldine and her newborn son Prince Leka.5 Although Grant readily agreed, Geraldine recovered sufficiently from childbirth to flee the country with her husband. Zog’s flight deprived him of much of his political legitimacy and despite constant efforts he was unable to convince the Americans to extend him recognition as the official Albanian government in exile.
The Second World War and Hoxha period, saw an even more restricted level of American involvement in Albanian issues. During the war, the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agreed in 1942 that Albania was to fall within the British zone of operations. The British, therefore, took the lead in supplying Albanian resistance groups and carrying out independent acts of sabotage against Axis and collaborationist targets. The American did launch a series of small intelligence-gathering operations but not until November 1943, following the German invasion. There are a great many detailed reports filed by Albanian speaking OSS agents who sent back situation reports giving good descriptions of conditions in various part of the country.6 In one way this British-US arrangement and the lack of direct involvement during the war was to the advantage of future Albanian-American relations. The British, by frequent mistakes in political warfare during the course of the war, squandered some of the goodwill that they had developed in Albania during the interwar period. The United States, on the other hand, Hoxha’s shrill anti-Western siege nationalism not withstanding, remained for many Albanians a hazy ray of distant hope – and we see the development of something of a myth of America.
Following the war the Americans established an unofficial observer mission under the experienced foreign service officer Joseph E. Jacobs whose mission was to study (Continued on page 7)
country conditions with a view towards the eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Albania. In a comprehensive 300-page report submitted to Washington in July 1945, Jacobs recommended that the United States recognize Hoxha at the easiest possible moment, but only in consideration of Hoxha meeting certain democratic criteria, including a free secret-ballot general election.7 While Hoxha announced a willingness to comply with these requirements, he would not agree to a further demand that his government confirm the treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Albania prior to 7 April, 1939. The US did not expect to maintain a large role in the Balkans in the postwar period so these negotiations dragged on as official anti-Americanism grew, resulting in severe restrictions on American representatives. The final result of these circumstances was the withdrawal of the American mission in November of 1946, and the freezing of relations until 1991.
Hoxha attempted on numerous occasions – in 1947 and 1949 – to restart talks but the US was uninterested. By this point it had of course already become involved in the abortive British plot to overthrow Hoxha. British MI6 and the CIA decided to focus on Albania as their first covert operation to roll back communism with the hope that trouble for Hoxha would encourage some remaining anti-communist guerrilla groups still active in other Eastern European countries. The CIA reasoned that the Soviets would not be provoked over Albania and with MI6 set up guerrilla training centers to train anti-communist Albanians in West Germany, Malta, and Cyprus with the active participation of David Smiley, who had served with the SOE in Albania during the war. The operation was doomed for various reasons, including the fact that the MI6 representative in Washington responsible for coordinating with the CIA was the Soviet mole Kim Philby. But it is reasonable to assume that even if Philby had not relayed detailed plans to the Soviets, the operation would have failed in any case due in part to increasing Hoxhaist security and a climate of fear, which MI6 and the CIA had seriously underestimated.8
Very little changed in terms of US-Albanian relations until the collapse of communism in Albania in the early 1990s, which constitutes the second period upon which I would like to concentrate. Desperate to save what could be saved, the Alia regime rapidly expanded foreign contacts including conversations with the US in May 1990. These initial contacts were limited however, as the George H.W. Bush administration gauged the Albanian government’s willingness to support democratic reform. As the Alia regime was pushed ever further down the road to reform, the US and Albania formally reestablished relations in March 1991, followed by the remarkable visit by Secretary of State James Baker in June. While US material assistance at this early stage was limited to a relatively modest six million dollars, American willingness to sponsor Albania for membership in various international organizations was of much greater importance.
The US role expanded rapidly to include actual participation in the March 1992 elections which saw the American ambassador William Ryerson appearing at Democratic Party rallies. With the election of the Democrats under Sali Berisha, US interest and involvement expanded exponentially as the collapse of Yugoslavia presented new challenges and dangers. The great fear for Albania was the so-called “spillover” effect which foresaw the possibility of Albania being dragging into the Yugoslav wars.9 The Albanian government rightly concluded that since the Council of Europe and the European Union were essentially without a military component and could be of only limited help in terms of national security and border stability, NATO and the United States by necessity would be the focus of security policy.10 Albania requested the establishment of US military bases on Albanian soil and applied, in June 1992, for membership in NATO.
While not yet ready to grant all Albanian requests, the US nevertheless responded vigorously and expanded the relationship. Not only was there a growing understanding in Washington of the significance of Albania for the region, but the US also believed that military reform was a critical step on the road to democratization and stability.11 The US therefore initiated a policy of Albanian integration into Western security structures including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace program which aimed at creating greater understanding between NATO and Eastern Europe, and a bilateral partnership program with US state national guards. Bilateral defense consultations were begun facilitated by an increasing schedule of reciprocal visits. And despite the fact that the George H.W. Bush administration contained high-level foreign policy advisors who could be considered partial to Yugoslavia, in December 1992 it issued the so-called “Christmas warning” making it clear that unilateral military action in support of Albanian interests was not out of the question. This warning, while not seen as an official commitment, was welcomed by the Albanian side and reiterated by the Clinton administration in 1993.
The mid to late 1990s, however, saw a lull in the expansion of the US-Albanian relationship. This was due in part to the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 which for the US temporarily removed the Balkans in general from its list of policy priorities. The US saw Albania decline in terms of strategic significance. Part of the problem may actually have been that President Clinton preferred a foreign policy which avoided the overt use of American power particularly where others were better situated. As a result, the Clinton administration determined to allow the Europeans to deal with the crisis of 1997 in Albania, offering encouragement but little else.
But the growing Kosovo crisis reversed the lull and essentially forced renewed American interest in the region. Following a vigorous internal debate, the United States and NATO confirmed in December 1997 that NATO interest extended beyond Bosnia and expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Albania emerged as a possible staging area for operations in Kosovo and once again offered all of its military facilities. Not only did it host a series of NATO exercises but also welcomed some 7,000 US troops, most of whom were assigned to a contingent of Apache attack helicopters.12 The Albanian-American community was mobilized in support of the KLA, contributing some thirty million dollars to the cause.13 In conjunction with the March 1999 air war against Serbian targets, the US, along with NATO and the EU, launched a series of extensive humanitarian operations in Albania to cope with the massive refugee crisis created by the war. As a result of these efforts, Serbian forces quit Kosovo and the US rose significantly in the esteem of Albanians everywhere.
In general, the post Kosovo war period saw the US continue to encourage regional and European integration as well as continue to encourage Albania along the lines of military and other reforms in preparation for NATO membership. But the George W. Bush administration was somewhat slower to develop the same enthusiasm for Albanian issues demonstrated by Mr. Clinton and the elder Mr. Bush. Ultimately, however, the Bush administration, too, became more aware and involved without giving up its long-term goal of disengagement. This renewed interest stemmed from the realization that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable, the need to further stabilize the region, the continuing pressure from the Albanian-American community in the United States, and Albania’s consistent support of US foreign policy objectives in the region and beyond. The US, although encouraging deeper reform internally, was very appreciative of what it considered Albania’s moderating influence on the situations in Macedonia and Kosovo. Albania also proved to be very supportive in America’s foreign policy priorities, including its struggle against international terrorism, as well as providing logistical support for KFOR in Kosovo, dispatching troops to support efforts in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the granting of airspace, ports and land bases at the disposition of the limited coalition which America collected to support its efforts in Iraq. In a move that put Albania at odds with much of the EU, it also was willing, in 2003, to sign a bilateral agreement with the US to guarantee the non-surrender of US nationals to the International Criminal Court, which is generally referred to as “article 98.”
The Bush administration responded with further US involvement including encouragement in the creation of the Adriatic Charter to advance Albania’s candidacy for NATO membership, a 2004 supplemental agreement to the Partnership for Peace program, as well as funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which allowed Albania to become perhaps the first state in the world to complete destruction of declared chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2007. Washington also remained a stalwart advocate of Albania’s NATO prospects and played a significant role in the invitation to join which Albania received in April 2008 and which seems still to be fully on track. The Bush administration, despite some internal opposition from influential foreign policy advisers, like former UN ambassador John Bolton, also of course was an enthusiastic advocate of Kosovar independence. The relationship between the US and Albania was capped by top level exchanges which saw Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others visit Albania and then reached a symbolic high point with President Bush’s historic visit to Albania in June of 2007.
(Continued next week)
Bernd J. Fischer is Professor and Chair Department of History Indiana University, Fort Wayne. Bernd Fischer is also Senior Associate researcher of Albanian Institute for International Studies( AIIS ). The first version of this article was presented at AIIS security and Foreign Policy Forum on Foreign Policy agenda of new US Administrating. January 26, 2009.
1 See Nicholas Pano, “The Albanian-American Community and Albania: Retrospect and Prospect,” unpublished paper, p. 3.
2 Ibid., p. 23.
3 Ibid., p. 5.
4 For more on these events see Dhimiter Binaj, “An Analysis of United States-Albanian Security Relations in light of the War on Terrorism,” Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2004.
5 Bernd J. Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in Albania (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 275.
6 Bernd J. Fischer, Albania at War, 1939-1945 (London: Hurst and Co., 1999) p. 276.
7 Bernd J. Fischer, “The United States and Albania during the period of the Monarchy: An Overview,” unpublished paper, p. 13 and Binaj, “An Analysis of United States-Albanian Security Relations,” pp. 27-29.
8 Binaj, “An Analysis of United States-Albanian Security Relations,” pp. 41-42
9 James Pettifer, “Albania, FYROM and Kosova: Evolving States and the European Union,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 2002, p.2.
10 Ibid.
11 Binaj, “An Analysis of United State-Albanian Security Relations,” pp. 48-50.
12 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
13 Stacy Sullivan, “Was the KLA a criminal, terrorist, and Islamist Organization?” in Anna Di Lellio ed., The Case for Kosova, Passage to Independence (London: Anthem Press, 2006) p. 105.
